


# DEMOCRATIC, TOLERANT, AND DIVERSE DIALOGUES










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## 1.

# Presentation

## Mission:

The Electoral Observation Mission (MOE Colombia) is a civil society platform that fosters the exercise of civil and political rights, promotes citizen participation, and strengthens state institutional capacities through electoral integrity monitoring, as well as advocacy, training, research, and strategic communication.

## Vision:

By 2032, MOE will be an international benchmark on democracy-related issues, recognized for its technical and methodological expertise in the comprehensive observation of electoral processes. At the national level, it will be a platform with the capacity to communicate, take action, and drive the strengthening of citizen participation and the institutions shaping political-electoral matters.

The Electoral Observation Mission – MOE Colombia – is a platform of civil society organizations whose institutional mission is to promote the exercise of civil and political rights, citizen participation, and the strengthening of state institutional capacities through electoral integrity monitoring, advocacy, training, research, and communication strategies<sup>1</sup>.

MOE was established in February 2006 as a citizen response to the capture of territories and democratic spaces in Colombia by various illegal armed groups. This milestone marked the beginning of a committed effort to defend and promote democracy.

Over its 19 years of operation, MOE has observed 141 electoral processes, including Presidential, Congressional, and Local Authorities elections, as well as Youth Municipal Councils, School Governments, and other citizen participation mechanisms. This has been possible thanks to a strong electoral observation network that has involved more than 66,000 national observers and over 2,000 international observers.

MOE's citizen engagement in the territories is materialized through a national platform consisting of 35 regional coordinations, which articulate through a network of more than 500 non-governmental and social organizations. These include organizations of women, youth, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, trade unions, cultural and religious groups, universities, and civic movements. As a result of this collaborative effort, MOE has successfully deployed electoral observation in all 32 regions of the country, covering a total of 980 municipalities. Today, MOE is a reference in defending democracy and political-electoral participation in Colombia.

Furthermore, MOE acknowledges and draws strength from human diversity and differences. The organization has a strong commitment to promoting and ensuring the political rights of historically excluded and underrepresented populations.

<sup>1</sup> At the beginning of 2024, MOE conducted an internal evaluation with the national team and the 35 regional coordinations responsible for electoral deployment in the 32 regions of the country. The objective of this evaluation was to identify challenges and strategies to continue strengthening actions for the promotion of democracy in Colombia. Additionally, as part of a participatory strategic planning exercise, MOE updated its institutional mission and vision. See: MOE's Mission, Vision, and Values <https://www.moe.org.co/la-moe/>

It is also important to highlight the recent Resolution of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights<sup>2</sup>, which recognizes electoral observers as human rights defenders. This recognition underscores the importance of electoral observation in ensuring transparency, legality, and fairness in electoral processes, which are fundamental to strengthening solid and participatory democracies.

In this regard, electoral observation in Colombia has become a key pillar of its democracy. Fulfilling this role, MOE has monitored electoral processes objectively and technically, focusing not only on identifying irregularities but also on highlighting best practices and proposing improvements to strengthen democracy. MOE's presence in Colombia has contributed to transparency, enhanced citizen trust, and promoted fair and participatory electoral conditions.

## 2.

## ***MOE Strategic Plans: Our Missionary Roadmap***

MOE operates based on four-year strategic plans aligned with the electoral cycles of national and local elections. Due to Covid-19 pandemic, the organization's work was impacted, and the execution timelines of the plans were altered. As a result, in 2022, the implementation of a new plan titled ***"Balance of Democracy at a Quarter of the 21st Century"*** began, which covered the 2022 national elections and the 2023 local elections.

However, in order to align MOE's plans with the electoral cycles, which begin one year before the national elections and in response to new contexts of violence and challenges for democracy, 2024 was established as a transitional year for the formulation of a new strategic plan. Its implementation will begin in 2025, which is the pre-electoral year for the 2026 elections.

For the 2025-2028 four-year period, MOE presents its new strategic plan, ***"Democratic, Tolerant, and Diverse Dialogues,"*** to the international community, allies, public institutions, and citizens in general. In response to the challenges of democracy in Colombia and globally, this plan aims to promote a democratic and inclusive political culture based on dialogue, through social control of electoral integrity; strengthening citizenship and democratic institutions; influencing peace, security, and democracy policies; and the responsible use of digital technologies and political communication.

The implementation of this new strategic plan will begin in 2025, alongside the opening of the electoral calendar, one year before the 2026 Congressional and Presidential elections. Its execution will extend until 2028, one year after the 2027 Local Authorities elections, covering various aspects that influence electoral processes before, during, and after the elections, as well as the different democratic participation mechanisms that may arise during this period. With this strategic plan, MOE reaffirms its commitment to strengthening democracy, promoting citizen participation, and defending electoral integrity in Colombia and globally.

<sup>2</sup> Resolution No. 01/2024 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Retrieved from <https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/jsForm/?File=/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2024/112.asp>



## 3.

## Context Analysis

In Colombia, violence has been a key tool in politics, benefiting various actors and interests competing for control of territories, natural resources, and populations. Additionally, there remains a deep democratic fragility, manifested in a covert relationship between political-private corruption and the excessive use of resources in electoral campaigns. This issue is reflected in various irregularities and electoral crimes, concealed by the lack of accountability regarding the financing of political campaigns. These problems are further amplified in a polarized society, where disinformation and digital violence spread, particularly on social media, making democratic dialogue and discussion more challenging.

**(1). Plebiscite.** The Final Agreement between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-EP guerrilla group stands as one of the most significant efforts to break the cycle of violence in Colombian politics, strengthen democratic institutions, and provide institutional avenues to address the profound inequalities and structural causes of conflict in the country's territories. An essential event for understanding the current political landscape in Colombia is the Peace Plebiscite, held on October 2, 2016, which sought to consult citizens on the approval or rejection of this agreement.

However, the narrow result — with “Yes” reaching 49.79% and “No” at 50.21% — revealed the deep political and social polarization, reflected in the tone of the debates and the opposing positions expressed through the media and, especially, on social media. The low voter turnout, close to 37% of the electoral roll, fueled the controversy over the legitimacy of the process. Furthermore, the geographic distribution of votes showed that “Yes” predominated in the areas most affected by the conflict, while “No” was concentrated in the major urban centers, highlighting the latent political divides and tensions in the country.

**(2). Peace Agreement – Initial Progress.** After the “No” victory, the government was forced to renegotiate parts of the agreement with the opposition, resulting in a new Peace Agreement titled “For the Termination of the Conflict and the Building of a Stable and Lasting Peace,” which was ratified by Congress at the end of 2016. This agreement addressed crucial issues such as rural reform, political participation, and support for victims.

Some initial progress included: (i) The political reintegration of the demobilized FARC-EP guerrilla group, which organized into a political party to participate in electoral processes under the established rules; (ii) The reactivation of the National Peace, Coexistence, and Reconciliation Council (Decree 885 of 2017); (iii) The creation of Territorial Peace Councils; (iv) The approval of the Opposition Statute (Law 1909 of 2018); and (v) The integration of the Special Electoral Mission (MEE), which included MOE as an expert organization, and formulated recommendations for structural reforms to the political and electoral systems<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> This reform was supposed to include, among other things, the creation of an electoral institution independent from political organizations with strengthened capacities, as well as appropriate rules to control the financing of campaigns.



**(3). 2018 Elections – Peace Agreement.** As the 2018 Congressional and Presidential elections approached, the main focus of the debate continued to revolve around the Peace Agreement and its implementation. With the electoral victory of the Centro Democrático party, led by Iván Duque, the implementation of many of its central points faced legislative, governmental, and judicial challenges between 2018 and 2022.

**(4). Political Reform.** In terms of political reform, the recommendations of the Special Electoral Mission (MEE) were disregarded. However, at the end of 2020, an attempt was made to approve a new Electoral Code in the Congress of the Republic to replace the current one, which dates back to before the 1991 Constitution. Although it did not achieve the expected political reform objectives, the proposal aimed to strengthen democracy in the electoral sphere and the exercise of rights for historically excluded or discriminated population sectors. However, on April 21, 2022, the new Electoral Code was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court due to procedural flaws.

**(5). Institutional Presence.** Furthermore, the lack of state presence in providing goods and services in the 170 municipalities selected as part of the Territorial Development Programs (PDET)<sup>4</sup> intensified social, economic, environmental, and political tensions in these territories. This situation facilitated the emergence, fragmentation, and dispersion of various armed groups and criminal organizations, as well as an increase in threats and homicides, particularly targeting social leaders. On the other hand, there was also a rise in illicit crop cultivation, deforestation, and illegal mining.

**(6). Peace Seats.** In terms of political representation for the inhabitants of these territories, after intense political and legal debates, in mid-2021 the Constitutional Court decided to approve the Legislative Act project “which creates 16 Special Transitional Peace Constituencies (CITREP) for the House of Representatives” for the 2022-2026 and 2026-2030 periods.

Although this decision offered an opportunity for territorial and population-based expansion of democracy, the regulation of these constituencies was incomplete, failed to acknowledge the realities in which the campaigns would take place, and contained various restrictive measures and requirements<sup>5</sup>. This affected the effective representation of the inhabitants of the rural areas in the 167 municipalities that make up the 16 constituencies.

<sup>4</sup> These municipalities are characterized by being the territories most affected by violence, poverty, illicit economies, and institutional weakness.

<sup>5</sup> Although, given the scale of the challenge and the limited time for implementation, it is understandable that the regulation issued was incomplete, an analysis of the regulation reveals that it overlooked several factors. The regulation approved failed to consider that the CITREP candidacies have distinct characteristics, such as not being political organizations, campaigning in rural areas with insufficient resources, and competing under different conditions compared to regular candidacies. This is evident, among other things, in:

(i) The measures related to financing (both by requiring candidates' promoters to process a guarantee policy to receive state funding, without any provision for its activation, and the delayed disbursement of advance payments); (ii) The additional and excessive requirements established in the secondary regulation to validate the existence and right to candidacy of organizations, which hindered the victims' right to participate in politics; and (iii) The lack of affirmative action to form lists composed solely of women.

**(7). Corruption.** At the same time, corruption remained a persistent topic of public debate, arising from various scandals in both public institutions and political campaigns, as well as from measures discussed and, in some cases, adopted by Congress that impacted the institutional guarantees surrounding elections.

For example, Congress eliminated contracting rules<sup>6</sup> established to counteract partisan practices in state contracting, although this was later declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in May 2022. Similarly, during the discussion of the new Electoral Code and the Anti-Corruption Law, proposals were presented that sought to silence criticisms and questions directed at public officials. The latter overlooked the guarantees protecting freedom of expression, one of the essential rights in a democratic system, which allows citizens to make informed decisions, fostering transparency and political oversight of public affairs.

**(8). Social Protests.** This institutional context was further compounded by the growing citizen discontent expressed through protests from various social sectors that began at the end of 2019 and intensified with the 2021 mobilizations, known as the “social outbreak.” This occurred amid a global pandemic, which had countless impacts on life and health, exacerbating pre-existing economic and social problems, deepening inequality, and creating a lack of opportunities for millions of Colombians. These social mobilizations highlighted widespread demands for greater social justice, better job opportunities, improved access to education, and structural changes in the economic and political representation models.

**(9). Youth Political Participation.** In recent years, as a result of social mobilization, youth have developed informal participatory processes and practices, in which social media has played a particularly important role. The lack of trust in political parties, the rejection of traditional political practices, the lack of training, skepticism towards the electoral system, and dissatisfaction with a state that has been unable to effectively address their demands and needs have led to low youth participation and interest in the mechanisms and spaces for institutionalized participation.

A clear example of this was the 2021 elections for Youth Councils, in which only about 10% of eligible young voters participated. This situation occurred in a context of challenges in organizing the elections, given the restrictions imposed by the pandemic, along with the lack of civic education and dissemination, as well as the co-optation of organizational processes by political parties.

**(10). 2022 Elections.** In this context, the 2022 legislative and presidential elections took place in an atmosphere marked by institutional distrust, social demands, and intense political polarization, all of which fueled high expectations for political renewal. The social and economic challenges left in the wake of the pandemic not only exacerbated this discontent but also created the conditions for a reshuffling of political forces in both Congress and the Government. Furthermore,

<sup>6</sup> Rules contained in a paragraph of Article 38 of the Law of Guarantees.

the youth agenda became a key focus for various candidates, with this demographic receiving significant attention in campaign strategies and government proposals.

**(11). Violence.** The 2022 National Elections took place amid a continued rise in violence against political, social, and community leaders. It is important to note that violence targeting political leadership began to intensify<sup>7</sup>, a trend that has persisted into 2024. While the escalation of conflict and violence in the country did not spread to new territories in a widespread manner, it remained concentrated with greater intensity in areas historically affected by violence, which coincide with the PDET and CITREP municipalities.<sup>8</sup>

**(12). Electoral Integrity.** On the other hand, during the 2022 elections, other aspects that impacted electoral integrity became evident, such as political competition, democratic institutions, the use of technology in elections, and guarantees of transparency and access to information, among others.

**(13). Political Parties.** This electoral process was marked by an increase in the number of political parties. In addition to the 16 parties already represented in Congress, six new political organizations<sup>9</sup> were able to endorse candidates or participate in coalitions for the Congressional and/or Presidential elections. Notably, this number later rose to 37 legally recognized parties that took part in the following year's local elections.<sup>10</sup>

**(14). Coalitions.** In this context, the high number of new and/or minority political organizations led to the formation of coalitions as a strategy for electoral success and the preservation of legal status<sup>11</sup>. This surge in coalitions occurred amid a lack of adequate regulation, creating new challenges and issues for the political party system.

**(15). Women's Participation.** Despite the increase in the number of political organizations, there was no significant change in achieving

<sup>7</sup> Throughout the 2022 electoral period, violence against political leadership increased to the point that it nearly equaled violence against social leadership (43.8% versus 45.3%, respectively). In other words, political leaders were victims of 329 of the 751 violent incidents, while social leaders were affected by 340 incidents. Additionally, political leaders experienced the highest increase in victimization, with a 138% rise compared to the same period during the 2018 national elections, which recorded 138 violent incidents. This situation holds particular relevance in the context of the electoral calendar, given that political leaders are not only key actors in the elections but also because experiences since 2014 show that attacks on political leadership tend to intensify during electoral processes, as was the case in 2022. (See MOE, "Violence Against Political, Social, and Community Leaders During the 2022 National Electoral Calendar" and MOE, "2022 National Elections Observation Report: Congress and Presidency of the Republic," retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Noveno-informe-preelectoral-de-violencia-2.pdf> and <https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Informe-observacion-electoral-2022-Congreso-y-Presidencia-1.pdf>).

<sup>8</sup> See MOE, "Maps and Electoral Risk Factors. 2022 National Elections," available at [https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Mapas-de-Riesgo-Electoral-2022\\_DIGITAL-1.pdf](https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Mapas-de-Riesgo-Electoral-2022_DIGITAL-1.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> In four cases (Nuevo Liberalismo, Movimiento de Salvación Nacional, Partido Verde Oxígeno, and Partido Comunista Colombiano), legal recognition was restored after they had lost it due to violent events suffered at different times. Another party (Colombia Humana) was granted legal status after finishing second in the 2018 presidential elections, as the Constitutional Court interpreted the Opposition Statute to mean it should be recognized as a legal entity. The last case (Dignidad) gained legal status after splitting from the Polo Democrático party.

<sup>10</sup> The number of political parties has fluctuated over time due to decisions made by the National Electoral Council, the Council of State, and the Constitutional Court.

<sup>11</sup> For example, in the Senate of the Republic, three coalition lists were formed: the "Pacto Histórico" coalition, which brought together seven political organizations (Colombia Humana, MAIS, Polo Democrático, AICO, ADA, UP, and the Communist Party); the "Centro Esperanza" coalition, which included five (Alianza Verde, ASI, Colombia Renaciente, Verde Oxígeno, and Dignidad); and the coalition between MIRA and Colombia Justa Libres.





equitable political representation for women. This highlights the ongoing need to advance toward the adoption of parity rules in the composition of public office. For example, the number of women elected to the Congress of the Republic did not exceed 30% of its total composition, even though during 2022 it was the highest number of female legislators in the country's history.<sup>12</sup>

**(16). Ethnic-Racial Representation in Elections.** A notable aspect of the 2022 presidential elections was the increased participation of candidates with ethnic-racial backgrounds<sup>13</sup>. Four out of the six presidential tickets in the first round had an Afro-descendant vice-presidential candidate, three of whom were women.

This level of representation sparked discussions that were not traditionally part of the electoral debate. In particular, the discriminatory remarks circulating on social media against some candidates brought issues such as racism, discrimination, inequality, and social exclusion faced by ethnic-racial communities in Colombia into the spotlight.

**(17). Electoral Processes with a Differential Approach,** Regarding the actions of electoral authorities, prior to the start of the elections, the National Electoral Council (CNE) adopted two protocols to promote the inclusion of historically excluded groups, ensuring the voting rights of trans individuals<sup>14</sup> and fostering political participation for women, including measures to prevent and address gender-based political violence. Additionally, the National Civil Registry (RNEC) implemented protocols for people with disabilities in the electoral process. Although these measures were positive, the electoral observation carried out by MOE identified the need to strengthen their dissemination, ensure compliance, and conduct participatory monitoring in collaboration with specialized organizations on these issues.

In compliance with judicial decisions, the RNEC also adopted measures to ensure the voting rights of ethnic communities. However, MOE has highlighted that challenges persist in this area, such as the lack of identification, electoral education, accessibility of electoral materials, and polling stations in indigenous and Afro-descendant territories.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the CITREP represented a significant advance in political inclusion with the creation of 170 new rural voting stations. Nevertheless, these elections faced challenges related to participation and security that still require attention.

<sup>12</sup> The percentage of female candidates in the 2022 congressional elections was 38.4% for the Senate and 40.5% for the House of Representatives. Regarding the number of women elected, there was an almost 10% increase in women's participation as legislators compared to the 2018 elections, rising from 19.7% to 29.2% (30% in the Senate and 27.7% in the House of Representatives). (See MOE, "Electoral Results: Congress 2022," retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/DIGITAL-Resultados-Congreso-2022.pdf>).

<sup>13</sup> Between 1994 and 2018, there was only one (1) Afro-descendant candidate for the presidency, and only three (3) Afro-descendant individuals and two (2) indigenous people had run for vice presidency. Of these vice-presidential candidates, only one (1) was a woman (Afro-descendant). (See MOE, "Informe de Observación de Elecciones Nacionales 2022: Congreso y Presidencia de la República," retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Informe-observacion-electoral-2022-Congreso-y-Presidencia-1.pdf>).

<sup>14</sup> Regarding this protocol, it is worth noting that the CNE fully adopted a proposal formulated by MOE, Caribe Afirmativo, and the Foundation Group for Action and Support to Trans Individuals (GAAT).

<sup>15</sup> See MOE, "Report on the New Polling Stations for the Special Peace Constituencies." Retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/informe-sobre-los-nuevos-puestos-de-votacion-para-las-circunscripciones-especiales-para-la-paz/>

**(18). Use of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) in Elections.** Another important aspect to consider is the use of technology in the 2022 electoral process, where the implementation of technological tools for certain procedures, such as online voter registration, was introduced as an innovation. However, the late contracting of various technological solutions, low levels of transparency and access to information during procurement, as well as a lack of planning, education, dissemination, and failures in their development and implementation, undermined public and political organizations' trust in electoral authorities. This situation was further compounded by the absence of public and independent audits to assess how these technological solutions functioned.<sup>16</sup>

**(19). Vote-Counting Software.** One of the most debated issues leading up to the 2022 Congressional elections was the acquisition of state-owned vote-counting software, following a 2018 ruling by the Council of State. This ruling mandated that electoral authorities have “all the necessary and complete infrastructure,” specifically referring to vote-counting software that would enable “full traceability from vote counts to the official election declaration.”<sup>17</sup>

However, the software acquired did not fully comply with this mandate, as it was limited to consolidating national-level election results and did not cover the various stages of vote counting at the territorial level<sup>18</sup>. The RNEC's approach split the vote-counting process into two separate contracts, each handling different phases of vote aggregation. Additionally, the software was not designed for use in local elections.

The procurement process was also notably delayed—occurring less than two and a half months before the Congressional elections—and was marked by a lack of transparency regarding the audits commissioned by the RNEC<sup>19</sup>. This raised concerns about the integrity of the data processed by these technological tools and the inability to ensure full traceability of election results<sup>20</sup>.

**(20). Guarantees of Access to Information.** Related to the above, the Congressional elections saw a setback in the information that had

<sup>16</sup> See MOE, “Monitoring and Findings on the Procurement of Electoral Goods and Services and Guarantees for Access to Public Information. Congress and Presidency (2022) - Local Authorities (2023),” Retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2024.02.28-Contratacion-RNEC-SISTEMAS-TECNOLOGICOS-1-1.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> Council of State. Administrative Litigation Chamber. Section Five. Ruling No. 11001-03-28-00-2014-00117-00. Presiding Judge: Lucy Jeannette Bermúdez Bermúdez. Bogotá, D.C., February 8, 2018.

<sup>18</sup> While one system handles the processing of vote tallies at the territorial level (zonal, local, municipal, and district) and is privately owned, the other, which manages the vote tallying under the National Electoral Council, is state-owned.

<sup>19</sup> Although the RNEC contracted an external audit for the first technological solution and an internal audit for the second, the audit plans, their execution, findings, recommendations, and the implementation of these recommendations in the software were not made public. Furthermore, despite the RNEC presenting what it called an “Audit Plan” for the latter software to political organizations on January 19, 2022, these organizations were unable to conduct an audit in line with international standards due to a lack of adequate timelines, terms, and access.

<sup>20</sup> See MOE, “Analysis of Contracting, Implementation, and Access to Information Guarantees in the Vote-Counting Software. Congressional and Presidential Elections 2022 – Colombia”, Retrieved from: [https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/23022022\\_VF-INFORME-CONTRATACION%CC%81N-Y-AUDITORIA\\_SOFTWARE-ESCRUTINIOS.pdf](https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/23022022_VF-INFORME-CONTRATACION%CC%81N-Y-AUDITORIA_SOFTWARE-ESCRUTINIOS.pdf)

been provided to the public and political organizations<sup>21</sup> in previous electoral processes. These omissions led to an electoral process where it was unclear how some procedures would unfold, nor were the final data of the electoral roll available.

After the 2022 Congressional election, and following the identification of inconsistencies between the preliminary count and the final tally (with 659,539 votes for the national Senate district and 271,883 votes for the territorial district of the Chamber of Representatives not included in the preliminary count), a situation of disinformation persisted, as there was no clear response regarding what had happened with the transmission of the electoral results<sup>22</sup>.

Thus, the presidential elections were impacted by a climate of mistrust in the electoral authorities, as a result of what happened in the Congressional elections. This was evident in the legal actions surrounding the pre-count and scrutiny process, which, along with multiple requests from political organizations and electoral observation groups, called for greater and better transparency measures in the various procedures carried out by the RNEC and the CNE. In this way, access to information became the main demand from all those involved in the electoral process.

In response to this context, the electoral authorities had to implement a series of corrective measures, addressing requests and demands primarily raised in the Electoral Coordination and Monitoring Commissions and in judicial proceedings. As a result, the procedures that were already in progress and operating within the originally planned and contracted terms had to be modified.

**(21). Campaign Financing.** On the other hand, campaign financing has remained one of the most opaque aspects of electoral processes in Colombia. This has led to ongoing concerns about potential political-private corruption and the excessive use of resources during electoral contests. This persists despite the legal obligations established for candidacies and political parties<sup>23</sup>, and the fact that, since the 2011 elections, the National Electoral Council (CNE) has had the “Cuentas Claras” application, which is “mandatory [...] as the official mechanism for reporting campaign income and expenses” (Resolution No. 3097 of 2013).

<sup>21</sup> As an example, it can be pointed to the failure to hold consultation meetings with civil society, oversight bodies, and political parties regarding the pre-bidding and bidding documents, or the limited access provided by the RNEC to electoral observation and oversight organizations to monitor the voter registration process and the designation of voting jurors.

<sup>22</sup> See MOE, “Pronouncement 03 - Post-Electoral,” retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/pronunciamento-03/> and El Espectador (April 5, 2022), “MOE asks the Registraduría to explain new inconsistencies in the vote count,” retrieved from: <https://www.elespectador.com/politica/elecciones-colombia-2022/moe-pide-a-la-registraduria-explicar-nuevas-inconsistencias-en-conteo-de-votos/>

<sup>23</sup> To address this, there is a legal framework that establishes (i) the spending limits for each campaign according to the positions and constituency; (ii) the amounts that can be donated or contributed; (iii) the origin of these resources, such as whether they are advances, credits, personal contributions, family contributions, or private donations; (iv) the allowable uses of these funds, such as for propaganda, public events, administrative expenses, transportation costs, etc.; and (v) the prohibitions and the corresponding penalties.

It continues to be challenging to effectively track and control the resources mobilized in a political campaign for any electoral process. This is due to both the CNE's limited capacity and weaknesses in the income and expenditure reporting tool<sup>24</sup>, as well as the lack of timely accountability from significant citizen groups, political organizations, and candidates<sup>25</sup>.

**(22). Modification of the political map.** Beyond the institutional weaknesses and the raised concerns, one important aspect to highlight—particularly in light of different experiences in political transitions in the region—was the swift recognition of defeat by the opposition candidate, Rodolfo Hernández, and the political figures in government—President Iván Duque and the leader of the Centro Democrático, former President Álvaro Uribe—despite the narrow margin in the second round<sup>26</sup>.

This political shift marked a break with the traditional political hegemony, highlighting that a significant portion of society sought alternatives to address inequality, armed violence, economic precariousness, and the exclusion of historically marginalized sectors. It also generated expectations for a reorientation of the political agenda towards deepening and fulfilling the Peace Agreement, comprehensive rural reform, expanding social rights, and fighting corruption. However, polarization did not cease, and challenges related to governance, coordination, and dialogue between political and institutional actors persisted.

**(23) Total Peace.** In response to the increase in violence and the proliferation of illegal armed groups across various territories, the Petro administration launched the Total Peace policy. This initiative aims to establish negotiations or dialogues simultaneously with multiple actors, including dissident factions of the FARC, the ELN, and the Clan del Golfo.

To date, with no definitive results and some temporary suspensions, negotiation tables have been considered with: i) Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN); ii) Estado Mayor Central (EMC) – Iván Mordisco; iii) Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes (EMB) – Calarcá; iv) Comuneros del Sur (Disidencia del ELN); v) Segunda Marquetalia (SM) – Iván Márquez; vi) Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) – Alias Walter Mendoza; vii) Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC); viii) Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN); ix) Socio-legal urban dialogue tables in Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

It is important to note that, in the case of the last three groups, the absence of a legal framework for submission to justice hinders concrete progress in these negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of Law 2272 of 2022.

<sup>24</sup> This results in incomplete information (with candidacies not appearing on the portal), incorrect data (including errors in the identification details of the candidacies), non-processable information (as it is uploaded in PDF formats), scattered data (with each campaign's transactions split into 14 separate PDF files that had to be checked individually), and lacking traceability (since there is no date and time of transaction registration).

<sup>25</sup> See MOE, "How was the financing of the electoral campaigns for the Congress of the Republic 2022? Post-electoral report" and "Reports - Financing of campaigns and Significant Citizen Groups (GSC) in the local authorities elections of 2023." Retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Informe-de-financiacion-5.pdf> and <https://www.moe.org.co/informes-financiacion-de-las-campanas-y-los-grupos-significativos-de-ciudadanos-gsc-en-las-elecciones-de-autoridades-locales-de-2023/>

<sup>26</sup> Gustavo Petro secured 50.4% of the votes, while Rodolfo Hernández obtained 47.3%.





**(24) 2023 Elections in a Context of Violence.** Within this framework, the 2023 local elections took place amid a surge in violence against political, social, and community leadership—an upward trend that had been escalating in previous years<sup>27</sup>. A key feature of the violence during these elections was that, for the first time since 2016, political leaders were the most affected by lethal violence, which includes attacks and assassinations<sup>28</sup>.

The rise in violence against political leadership was accompanied by an increase in armed actions and intimidation by illegal armed groups across the country<sup>29</sup>. Additionally, the initiation of peace dialogues with various armed groups, combined with unilateral suspensions of hostilities that overlapped with announcements of armed strikes, created an insecure environment for the elections. Unfortunately, the lack of alignment between electoral strategies and the ongoing peace negotiations led to mixed and contradictory messages from some institutions from the outset of the electoral calendar.

At the same time, the persistence, expansion, and emergence of new illegal structures have facilitated deforestation, the expansion of illicit crops, and illegal mining, particularly affecting regions such as the Amazon and the Pacific<sup>30</sup>. Institutional weakness in addressing this phenomenon has resulted in limited progress in containment and eradication efforts.

**(25) Disjointed Actions of Electoral Authorities.** In this context, during these elections, there were constant messages questioning the possibility of holding elections in some municipalities due to potential interference from illegal armed groups. Additionally, the lack of timely information and decisions regarding the annulment of ballots due to potential electoral fraud and the disqualification of candidates raised doubts about the transparency of the institutions and the validity of the election results. This led to the current holding of several by-elections in various constituencies.

<sup>27</sup> The 2022-2023 Electoral Cycle was marked by a significant increase in violence against political, social, and community leadership, with 1,337 reported incidents. 2023 became the most violent year since the MOE began its monitoring efforts in 2016. See: Misión de Observación Electoral (April 5, 2024), Violence Against Political, Social, and Community Leaders – How Did 2023 End, and What Is the Outlook for 2024 Given the Security Situation in the Territories? Retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/informe-moe-la-violencia-contra-lideres-y-lideresas-politicas-sociales-y-comunales-como-termi-no-el-2023-y-cual-es-la-perspectiva-para-el-2024-ante-la-situacion-de-seguridad-en-los-territorio/>.

<sup>28</sup> Throughout the electoral calendar, 235 violent actions were reported against candidates running in the local elections, with 41 of them being fatal violence, including 33 attacks and 8 murders. In comparison, during the same period in 2019, there were 142 violent incidents against candidates, meaning this total represents a 65.5% increase compared to 2019. This was accompanied by a 51.8% increase in lethal incidents, rising from 27 in 2019 to 41 in 2023. See: Misión de Observación Electoral (2024) “Final Electoral Observation Report for the 2023 Local Authorities Elections”. Retrieved from: <https://www.moe.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2024.04.12-ULTIMA-VERSION-Informe-Final-de-Observacion-electo-ral-MOE-2023.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> In some municipalities, there is a strong correlation between the presence of an armed group and the levels of violence against social, political, or community leaders. In other municipalities, however, the territorial control of these armed groups is so extensive that there is little to no recorded violence against leadership, mainly because very few people dare to exercise any form of leadership. Likewise, in these municipalities, there tends to be significant underreporting of threats and acts of coercion against leaders, as the fear of retaliation limits the ability to report.

<sup>30</sup> Deforestation, driven by drug trafficking and illicit crops, has devastated vast areas across various regions of the country. Illegal mining, intensified by the rising price of gold and other precious metals, has worsened the situation, especially with the presence of illegal armed groups fighting for control of these illicit economies. Currently, these groups have increased their criminal governance in strategic regions, profiting from illegal economies. According to a recent report by Global Witness, Colombia has the highest global homicide rate for land and environmental defenders, with a total of 79 murders in 2023 (40% of the reported cases), bringing the total to over 400 activists killed in the last decade. These individuals were leaders in areas such as Magdalena Medio, the Pacific Coast, Montes de María, and the corridor between Meta and the Amazon—regions with a high presence of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. See: Global Witness (2024) Voices Silenced: Violence Against Land and Environmental Defenders. Retrieved from: [file:///C:/Users/ASUS/Downloads/Global\\_Witness\\_Land\\_And\\_Environmental\\_Defenders\\_Sep\\_2024\\_Report\\_Spanish\\_GAJ01mf.pdf](file:///C:/Users/ASUS/Downloads/Global_Witness_Land_And_Environmental_Defenders_Sep_2024_Report_Spanish_GAJ01mf.pdf)

On many occasions, the messages from the state institutions themselves, which warned about electoral risks, were not accompanied by the necessary preventive measures and plans to address these risks. Despite the existence of formal coordination mechanisms between the various authorities and political organizations, such as the Electoral Coordination and Monitoring Commissions, in which the MOE participates and presents recommendations<sup>31</sup>, the institutional disarray and misalignment prevented an adequate response to electoral contingencies.

Therefore, these messages, which could erode public trust in the electoral process, may have been further exacerbated given the narrow margins of victory between the winners and the runners-up.

## **(26) Disturbances and Protests Associated with the Electoral Process.**

During the election day, no actions by illegal armed groups were reported. However, in the days before and even after the elections, while the vote count was taking place, disturbances or protests were organized by political actors with the aim of disrupting the electoral process and/or discrediting the election results.

For the 2023 local elections, the MOE recorded a total of 91 incidents involving violent disturbances and protests, broken down into 77 disturbances and 14 protests of varying intensity, which caused different levels of impact<sup>32</sup>. This represents a 139% increase in the number of incidents compared to the 38 identified during the 2019 elections. On the municipal level, this means that disturbances occurred in 50 more municipalities than in 2019. The disturbances or protests registered by the MOE in 2023 occurred in 88 municipalities across 21 departments of the country<sup>33</sup>.

## **(27) Characteristics of Political Competition in the 2023 Elections.**

In the political-electoral sphere, the formation of coalitions as an electoral strategy, irrespective of ideological identities, continued to be a prominent phenomenon in the 2023 electoral process<sup>34</sup>. Another

<sup>31</sup> See MOE Reports in the Electoral Monitoring Commissions, available at <https://www.moe.org.co/informes-moe-en-las-comisiones-de-seguimiento-electoral/>, and see MOE Reports – National Commissions for the Coordination and Monitoring of Electoral Processes at <https://www.moe.org.co/informes-moe-comisiones-nacionales-para-la-coordinacion-y-seguimiento-de-los-procesos-electorales/>

<sup>32</sup> One of the most serious incidents occurred the day before the election in the municipality of Gamarra, Cesar, where, due to the burning of the municipal registry office, a staff member of the institution was killed, and the municipal registrar, along with two (2) other officials and two (2) police officers, were injured. Another notable incident took place in Santiago, Putumayo, where two polling stations in the municipality were taken over by citizens dissatisfied with the handling of some complaints from the public. In this event, electoral material was destroyed, and the election was suspended. In Ricaurte, Nariño, the opening of the municipal voting station, which held 70% of the electoral census for the municipality, was not possible due to clashes between political campaigns. In Fonseca, La Guajira, on October 29, disturbances occurred at two polling stations: in the Conejo district, where protesters entered the polling station, broke urns, and destroyed electoral material, and at the Calixto Maestre polling station in the urban area, where protesters destroyed part of the electoral material. During the pre-counting process, a curfew had to be imposed due to disturbances outside the municipal voting station.

<sup>33</sup> The 88 municipalities with recorded disturbances are characterized by an average voter turnout of 69.8%, which is more than ten percentage points higher than the national average of 59.3%. Notably, in 11 municipalities, electoral participation exceeds the national level by more than twenty percentage points. Within this group, the cases of La Jagua del Pilar, La Guajira; Imues, Nariño; Certegui and Rio Quito, Chocó; Cantagallo and El Guamo, Bolívar; Florencia and Sucre, Cauca stand out, where voter turnout exceeds 80% of the potential electorate. Additionally, 52% of the municipalities are characterized by having risk levels indicative of electoral fraud, and 13% face risks due to atypical levels of voter registration.

<sup>34</sup> While in 2019, 5,619 individuals ran in coalitions, in the election process of the previous year, a total of 12,388 nominees were presented, representing a 120% increase in the use of this figure. The majority of those elected, both for mayoralties (55%) and governorships (78%), come from coalitions.

particular feature of the most recent local elections was the participation of 35 political parties with legal status, double the number that competed in 2019, meaning 18 new parties. It is worth noting that since the 2003 local elections, there have not been so many political parties with legal status. This context also included the participation of significant citizen groups (GSC), which also benefited from the coalitions<sup>35</sup> by allying with the political parties.

In this context, citizens are faced with the task of recognizing and holding accountable each of the 35 political parties and 85 GSCs that won mayoralties, many of them in coalitions. Some coalitions involve many political parties, such as in 59 municipalities where the winning coalitions include more than five political organizations.

The abrupt increase in the number of political parties with legal status presents challenges related to representativeness and the future accountability of local leaders. In this scenario, the political responsibility of political parties, already complicated by the presence of 35 organizations, is further diluted in the web of coalitions.

Focusing on the political participation of women, a slight increase of 2% was observed in this year's elections. Although this represents progress, the proportion of female candidates for mayors and governors remains worryingly low, standing at 15% and 12%, respectively. This is also reflected in the number of women elected. Despite the introduction of gender parity as a constitutional principle nearly a decade ago, currently, only 22% of elected officials are women, with even lower proportions for mayoralties and governorships, reaching 13% and 18%, respectively<sup>36</sup>.

**(28) Legislative Action and Political Debate.** Beyond the electoral context and the measures taken to advance the “Total Peace” policy, the current government, with the support of its center-left coalition, has aimed to address structural issues such as political and electoral reform, health, pensions, labor, decentralization, state finances, and justice. Although some initiatives have made progress, the ideological diversity within the coalition and opposition in Congress has caused many of these projects to fail. The most recent of these, political reform, was shelved at the end of 2024<sup>37</sup>.

The political debate has taken place in an environment of intolerance and disqualification of those with differing views, negatively impacting not only democratic processes but also the construction of pathways to address the nation's issues. The discussion surrounding various allegations of potential violations of campaign financing limits and illegal funding during the campaign period, as well as alleged acts of corruption by officials in the current government

<sup>35</sup> The GSCs, which won 32 mayoralties individually, also won in 53 municipalities through coalitions. This means that 62% of the new mayors who registered through a GSC and won did so through a coalition.

<sup>36</sup> In reference to guarantees for promoting women's participation in politics, the approval by the Congress of the Republic in 2023 of a law to prevent, address and sanction violence against women in politics (VCMP) presents several challenges. Among them, effective coordination among state entities, especially for the reception and follow-up of complaints, the issuance of appropriate routes and protocols by the National Electoral Council, political organizations, and public corporations, as well as building capacities for the proper implementation of a gender perspective in political practice.

<sup>37</sup> It is important to highlight that one of the first legislative actions taken by Congress was the approval of a new Electoral Code, which was also declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court

**(29) Pending Issues for the Upcoming Electoral Cycle.** The context outlined highlights the challenges the country faces heading into the next electoral cycle of 2026-2027, particularly the need for alignment between peace, security, and electoral strategies in order to ensure free and transparent elections amidst a conflict scenario.

This alignment depends on the level of coordination and dialogue among the various institutions that play a central role in these processes, with the National Commission for the Coordination and Monitoring of Electoral Processes at the national level, as well as the Commissions at the subnational level, serving as suitable spaces to raise the corresponding alerts and recommendations to entities such as the National Registry Office, the National Electoral Council, the Ministry of the Interior, the Attorney General's Office, the Ombudsman's Office, the Prosecutor General's Office, the public security forces, and other entities with electoral jurisdiction.

**(30) CITREP.** Regarding the Special Transitional Peace Constituencies (CITREP), which will be elected for the last time in the 2026 elections, several challenges must be addressed in terms of security, citizen participation, and campaign financing, as well as the challenges to ensure the effective representation of women aspiring to these seats<sup>38</sup>. It is important to highlight that there is a constitutional mandate to guarantee electoral observation for these elections.

**(31). Political Parties, Proliferation, Disenchantment, Crisis of Representation.** Another element of the context for the upcoming electoral cycle that must be addressed is the crisis of representation, reflected in the decline of support and trust from the public towards political parties. According to Latinobarómetro figures (2023), in Colombia "satisfaction with democracy" only reaches 17 percentage points, while 60% of those surveyed believe that "democracy can function without political parties," and 84% consider that "political parties do not work well."<sup>39</sup> Despite these figures, the country currently has more than 30 political parties, most of which lack clear ideological platforms and internal democracy processes. This crisis of representation has led to the proliferation of other forms of political participation, such as significant citizen groups, which, although reflecting a diversity of voices, have also been vulnerable to instrumentalization and the amplification of populist rhetoric that delegitimizes institutions.

**(32). Role of Social Media and Disinformation.** Similarly, in the upcoming elections, the country will have to face both the challenge and the opportunity presented by social media, artificial intelligence, and various technological tools for democracy. Polarization and social and political tensions have also found a space in social media. Moreover, the exercise of political rights, as well as the celebration of free, fair, and transparent elections, are increasingly impacted by the emergence and dominant presence of new technologies.

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<sup>38</sup> Misión de Observación Electoral (June 13, 2024) "No mistakes can be repeated in the election of the CITREP in 2026":


MOE. Retrieved from:

<https://www.moe.org.co/en-el-2026-no-se-pueden-repetir-errores-en-la-eleccion-de-las-citrep-moe/>

<sup>39</sup> Corporación Latinobarómetro (July 21, 2023) Report 2023: The Democratic Recession in Latin America. Retrieved from:

<https://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>





Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have facilitated greater deliberation, the circulation of information, and political control. However, they have also led to informational disorder, which, since 2016, has been shown globally to negatively impact the integrity of electoral processes. This is due to the existence of orchestrated disinformation campaigns aimed at intentionally and massively distributing false information about actors and the electoral process at extremely high speeds. As a result, this can lead people to make decisions without having access to trustworthy, complete, and timely information that allows them to freely exercise their political rights.

Therefore, it is essential to implement a risk mitigation policy that respects freedom of expression and ensures that the public is well-informed. Although artificial intelligence and, in general, new technologies can offer opportunities to expand civic space, it is crucial to address these challenges from a rights-based perspective to ensure that technology serves to strengthen democracy and not negatively impact it.

**(33). Youth Participation.** In addition to what has been stated, it is important to note that in 2025, elections for Youth Councils will be called<sup>40</sup>. Beyond the proposals for reform to the Youth Citizenship Statute that have been presented in Congress, it is essential to encourage the political participation of young people through democratic channels.

For their influence to be effective in this and other spaces of representation, it is necessary to promote actions focused on political culture, electoral education, leadership, and strengthening their decision-making capacities in political matters. In this same vein, it is important to guarantee their access to information by recognizing the communication mechanisms they use, with a special emphasis on the responsible use of social media.

**(34) Erosion of Democracy in Latin America and Beyond.** The challenges facing Colombia cannot be analyzed in isolation. The crisis of public trust in democracy and institutions is a widespread issue across Latin America and the Caribbean. Paradoxically, while electoral processes are meant to uphold democratic values, they have also been used to weaken democracy, enabling the rise of populist governments and the consolidation of authoritarian regimes in several countries throughout the region.

For this reason, efforts to promote and safeguard democracy must extend beyond the Colombian context. Strengthening collaboration among civil society organizations—particularly electoral observation groups across the region—is essential. By working together, these organizations can not only address common challenges but also exchange best practices that contribute to the reinforcement of democratic institutions.

<sup>40</sup> In the 2021 Youth Council elections, the electoral roll was composed of 12,282,273 young people, of whom 1,266,857 exercised their right to vote, representing a turnout of 10.31%.

# 4.

## Our New Strategic Plan's Commitments

Considering the previously outlined context, Colombia faces various institutional weaknesses, as well as a deficit in an inclusive democratic political culture based on dialogue. This has impacted citizen participation and trust in political-electoral processes. Additionally, security issues, social and environmental conflicts, and tensions surrounding the use of digital technologies in political communication contribute to misinformation, polarization, and the weakening of democratic principles.

Therefore, for the 2025-2028 period, MOE presents its new strategic plan, titled **“Democratic, Tolerant, and Diverse Dialogues”**, which has the general objective of “promoting an inclusive democratic political culture based on dialogue through fostering social oversight of electoral process integrity; strengthening citizen participation and democratic institutions; influencing public policies related to peace, security, and democracy; and promoting the responsible use of digital technologies and communication in political-electoral contexts.”

For MOE, a democratic political culture goes beyond elections. It is a comprehensive way of understanding, perceiving, and participating in politics, grounded in a set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors that promote respect for human rights, justice, equity, freedom, and dialogue. It entails active and continuous citizen participation, as well as the strengthening of democratic institutions that ensure conflict resolution, coexistence, and the peaceful transition of power.

To achieve its general objective, the 2025-2028 strategic plan defines four specific objectives, outlined below:

- I. Influence democratic participation mechanisms through citizen oversight, promoting access to justice and combating electoral corruption, as well as generating and analyzing political-electoral data.
- II. Strengthen dialogue spaces between citizens, civil society organizations, and authorities, promoting an inclusive and tolerant democracy through strategies of monitoring, training, technical assistance, intervention, and dialogue with decision-makers.
- III. Promote the alignment of public policies on peace, security, and democracy through the formulation of recommendations aimed at improving institutional coordination to address violence and illegality dynamics and their impacts on the social, political, economic, and environmental spheres.
- IV. Foster citizens' digital rights and the responsible use of technologies in political and electoral contexts through education and analysis of their impact on political communication, citizen participation, and electoral integrity.

To achieve this, the implementation of four strategic lines is proposed:

1. Citizen oversight of electoral integrity
2. Civic participation and democratic institutions

### 3. Violence and its impact on democratic processes

### 4. Democracy in the digital age

These strategic lines are cross-cut by four pillars that serve as guiding principles, which permeate all four strategic lines and reflect the comprehensive nature of MOE's institutional priorities in relation to its mission and actions as an organization:

- ▶ **Territorial approach:** MOE is a platform that connects organizations with presence and influence in all departments of the country. This characteristic allows its actions to be designed and executed while considering the contexts, dynamics, and particularities of each territory, enabling a deep and accurate understanding of various phenomena at the national level. One of MOE's core principles is collaborative work through networks at different territorial levels, which maximizes the impact and effectiveness of its actions.
- ▶ **Differential approach:** MOE is a diverse organization that guides its mission-driven actions based on the principles of plurality and non-discrimination to promote the full and effective participation of historically excluded groups from democratic participation and representation spaces. In particular, its actions aim to strengthen the inclusion of women, LGBTIQ+ individuals, people with disabilities, youth, and individuals with ethnic and racial affiliations.
- ▶ **Communication for advocacy:** MOE understands communication as a valuable tool that promotes citizen mobilization for social, political, and cultural transformations. Similarly, it uses communication as a means to maintain an open and constructive dialogue with decision-makers and various stakeholders. Through a participatory and advocacy-oriented approach, MOE uses communication to raise visibility of agendas, raise awareness, and build networks that promote informed participation and the consolidation of democracy.
- ▶ **International advocacy:** The political-electoral agenda in Colombia is connected to global dynamics that address the challenges and opportunities of democracy. In this context, MOE maintains an active presence in international dialogue forums and networks, promoting the leadership of citizens. In particular, MOE promotes and supports citizen electoral observation initiatives as a key collective action mechanism to ensure transparency and democratic participation.

Considering these cross-cutting pillars, the four strategic lines are broken down into 13 lines of action, among which the following stand out: the appropriation of democratic spaces; the promotion and access to electoral justice; the fight against corruption and electoral transparency; strengthening participation spaces; strengthening institutions and good governance; the impact of violence on different types of leadership; social and environmental conflicts; and the defense of digital rights in political-electoral contexts.

# 5.

## ***Specific Objectives, Strategic Lines, and Lines of Action.***

### ***Specific Objective I***

The first specific objective of the plan is aimed at “influencing democratic participation mechanisms through citizen oversight, promoting access to justice and combating electoral corruption, as well as generating and analyzing political-electoral data.”

This will be materialized through the following strategic line:

### ***Strategic Line I. Citizen oversight of electoral integrity***

This strategic line seeks to address the various challenges and weaknesses, both in institutional performance and political competition, identified in recent electoral processes. It also responds to MOE’s interest in promoting citizen oversight of electoral integrity, understood as compliance with internationally recognized democratic principles and standards to ensure free, fair, and transparent elections.

This approach is not limited to election day observation but encompasses comprehensive monitoring of the different stages of the electoral process. It includes the implementation of methodologies and monitoring mechanisms that assess key aspects such as participation guarantees, the functioning of the party system, campaign financing, contextual conditions, transparency guarantees and access to information, operational preparedness, the vote-counting process, and the fulfillment of responsibilities by the institutions involved in electoral processes, both before and after elections.

This first strategic line, in turn, consists of four lines of action:

### **Line of Action 1.1. Social appropriation of democratic spaces**

During the 2026-2027 cycle, MOE will deploy its observation efforts for the Congressional elections (March 2026), Presidential elections (first and second rounds, May and June 2026), and Local Authorities elections (October 2027). A total of at least 12,000 observers, both national and international, are expected to participate. Additionally, observation will be conducted for special elections, citizen participation mechanisms (recall votes, popular consultations, plebiscites), and internal consultations of political parties, according to prioritization criteria. Through these efforts, citizens not only exercise political oversight but also take ownership of democratic processes.

In recent years, MOE has conducted electoral observation with a differential approach, focusing on the participation of trans individuals and people with disabilities to verify compliance with voting protocols adopted by the National Electoral Council. During the upcoming



electoral processes, MOE, in partnership with organizations such as Caribe Afirmativo, the Trans Support Group (GAAT), Asdown Colombia, and the PAIS Program at Universidad de los Andes, will deploy trans and disabled observers. These individuals will themselves monitor, raise alerts, and provide recommendations on the progress and challenges in exercising their right to vote in Colombia.

Similarly, recognizing the fundamental role that political parties play in representative democracy processes, MOE will continue working to strengthen Colombia's party system. This includes addressing the challenges arising from insufficient and incomplete regulations regarding representativeness, accountability, and internal democracy within political organizations. This will be achieved through both monitoring and tracking their participation in electoral processes, as well as through dialogue and advocacy efforts before the Congress of the Republic.

Finally, in line with the institutional vision for 2032, MOE will continue strengthening its agenda and international presence in various networks and global forums. In particular, MOE will remain an active member of the Electoral Observation and Integrity Network (Red OIE), supporting dialogue and observation efforts on political-electoral dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean. Likewise, it will maintain its presence and engagement in other international spaces and networks dedicated to defending democracy, such as the Global Network for Securing Electoral Integrity (GNSEI) and the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM).


### Line of Action 1.2. Promotion and access to electoral justice


Before each electoral process, MOE develops a risk matrix to identify key risk factors and their corresponding variables, which could positively or negatively impact each electoral cycle in the country. In other words, it identifies potential challenges that upcoming electoral processes may face.

Additionally, MOE activates the virtual platform Pilas con el Voto, where citizens can report electoral irregularities and offenses in real time during elections. During the 2022-2023 electoral cycle, MOE received over 7,000 reports through Pilas con el Voto, which were analyzed and forwarded to the Immediate Response Unit for Electoral Transparency (URIEL) and entities such as the Attorney General's Office for investigation and prosecution. Notably, in 2023, almost 40% of the information on electoral anomalies, irregularities, and offenses submitted to URIEL originated from the Pilas con el Voto platform.<sup>41</sup>

Additionally, MOE provides the "Ruta Electoral" (Electoral Roadmap) to various institutional and social actors, as well as to the general public. This guide allows different stakeholders in the electoral process to understand each step of the electoral calendar milestones, along with their corresponding legal references. The Ruta Electoral is part of MOE's efforts to educate the public on the political and electoral

<sup>41</sup> See URIEL, "Report: January 1 – December 31, 2023. Immediate Reception Unit for Electoral Transparency (URIEL)," available at: [https://www.mininterior.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/informe\\_final\\_uriel\\_01\\_enero\\_-\\_31\\_de\\_diciembre\\_de\\_2023.pdf](https://www.mininterior.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/informe_final_uriel_01_enero_-_31_de_diciembre_de_2023.pdf).





legal framework and to provide ongoing assistance in response to information requests from citizens and public institutions regarding political and electoral matters.

It is important to highlight that MOE is the only civil society organization in Colombia with a permanent seat in the National and Sub-national Electoral Monitoring Commissions, as established by Decree 2821 of 2013. These commissions serve as inter-institutional spaces aimed at monitoring and making strategic decisions regarding the electoral process. They include entities such as the National Registry Office, the National Electoral Council, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ombudsman, the Attorney General's Office, law enforcement agencies, other electoral authorities, and political parties.

For example, during the 2023 local elections, MOE participated in all nine (9) National Commissions convened and in over 100 subnational commissions held throughout the electoral calendar, presenting progress reports on electoral observation along with corresponding recommendations. MOE is heard by various government authorities, maintaining open channels for dialogue from a citizen-led perspective.

### **Line of Action 1.3. Fight against corruption and electoral transparency**

As part of its initiatives to monitor electoral integrity in Colombia, MOE will continue to carry out monitoring of various aspects to promote transparent and democratic electoral processes. Among its actions, it focuses on overseeing the misuse of public goods and resources for electoral purposes by public officials and consistently following up on investigations related to elected officials, maintaining an ongoing dialogue with authorities on this matter.

Recognizing that campaign financing remains one of the most opaque aspects of electoral processes in Colombia, MOE continues to address this issue. This is due to the authorities' inability to effectively monitor the resources mobilized during an electoral year, as well as the poor accountability of those involved in the elections. Therefore, as part of this new electoral cycle, MOE will continue to monitor campaign financing, promoting responsible and transparent practices in reporting income and campaign expenses through the National Electoral Council's platform called "Cuentas Claras". MOE will also continue to monitor campaign advertising spending on social media.

In relation to the above, and considering that private resources are one of the main sources of campaign financing, MOE will continue its dialogue, coordination, and cooperation efforts with the country's business and trade organizations to promote transparent and responsible private financing.

Finally, MOE is the only organization in Colombia that conducts oversight of electoral contracts by the National Registry Office and evaluates public access to information during the electoral cycle. Through this action, MOE not only promotes social control and accountability of democratic institutions but also ensures transparency in the use of technological tools in electoral processes.

## Line of Action 1.4. Political-electoral data analytics

As part of monitoring the integrity of electoral processes, MOE will activate its monitoring systems for topics such as voter registration, the registration of significant citizen groups, candidacy registration, legal status of political organizations, coverage and access to polling stations, among others. In previous electoral processes, these exercises have provided information that encourages free and informed citizen participation and allows for timely alerts and recommendations to authorities.

One of the most impactful products is the Electoral Risk Maps and Factors (MRE), a document created by MOE in collaboration with specialized organizations and professionals, which identifies municipalities at risk due to factors of violence and electoral fraud. These maps are used as inputs by entities such as the Office of the Attorney General, National Police, Ombudsman's Office, National Registry Office, Ministry of the Interior, and other institutions, to prioritize actions within their institutional competencies.

MOE will continuously update its Electoral Data website<sup>42</sup>, which serves as the political-electoral information system for the organization. This mechanism allows for the capture, systematization, and publication of relevant information on historical electoral data, electoral risks, violence monitoring, and more.

Finally, MOE will continue promoting the analysis of democratic behaviors and trends through the application and publication of surveys on candidates and elected officials regarding issues of interest in the political-electoral agenda.

### ***Specific Objective II.***

The second objective of the strategic plan focuses on “strengthening dialogue spaces between citizens, civil society organizations, and authorities, with the purpose of promoting an inclusive and tolerant democracy. This will be achieved through strategies of monitoring, training, technical assistance, intervention, and dialogue with decision-makers.” This objective will be materialized through the following strategic line:

### ***Strategic Line 2. Civic participation and democratic institutions.***

Through this line, MOE aims to promote the understanding and practice of a tolerant and diverse democratic political culture by citizens and government institutions, thereby strengthening trust and relationships among the actors of the system.

To achieve this, MOE will support civil society organizations to strengthen their capacity for influencing institutions. Additionally, information and educational campaigns will be carried out to raise awareness about the importance of citizen and political participation for the deepening of democracy.

<sup>42</sup> <https://www.datoselectorales.org/>

In order to strengthen the participation and effective involvement of youth citizens, actions related to political culture, electoral education, leadership, and capacity building for political decision-making will be promoted. Moreover, efforts will be made to ensure their access to information by recognizing the communication mechanisms they use, with a special focus on the responsible use of social media.

On the other hand, MOE will work on strengthening institutions and democratic processes, recognizing the negative impacts that institutional weaknesses, lack of accountability, opacity, and limited access to information have on citizen trust. Furthermore, dialogue will continue with decision-makers to push for the necessary political, electoral, and participation reforms through open, deliberative, and informed discussion processes.

The second strategic line of the plan consists of three (3) lines of action:

### **Line of Action 2.1 Strengthening participation spaces**

In addition to observing general electoral processes, MOE will continue to consolidate its technical support and observation of other citizen participation bodies and spaces, such as the electoral processes of Juntas de Acción Comunal (Community Action Boards), student representatives in school government structures, departmental and national Victims' boards, as well as the election of the Municipal Youth Councils. Regarding these processes, MOE will not only carry out electoral observation, but will also undertake training actions, identify and analyze regulatory gaps, and develop proposals to improve the effectiveness of democratic participation.

Furthermore, the strengthening of participation spaces necessarily involves monitoring and advocating for compliance with the participation guarantees established in the Final Peace Agreement concerning item No. 2, which refers to "political participation and democratic opening to build peace." This chapter includes, among others, the election of the Transitional Peace Constituencies (CITREP), the Opposition Statute, and the political reintegration process of former combatants.

Finally, this line also aims to continue promoting the political participation of traditionally excluded and underrepresented groups. In addition to observation with a focus, MOE will carry out training exercises for leaders of historically excluded groups and will promote coordination and advocacy at national and international levels, in spaces such as the Latin American and Caribbean Observatory of the Political and Electoral Rights of Trans People and the Coalition for the Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

### **Line of Action 2.2 Strengthening civil society organizations**

This line of action focuses on strengthening citizen participation and collective action among social organizations linked to MOE's platform in Colombia, recognizing their fundamental role in building democracy in the territories. To achieve this, a capacity-building and strengthening plan will be implemented for regional organizations,

preparing them to face the challenges of the 2026-2027 electoral cycle. These actions will be complemented by the strengthening of territorial networks, promoting collaboration among social organizations in different regions of the country.


In parallel, strategies will be designed and implemented for democracy and citizenship education, aimed at promoting a political culture based on democratic values such as participation, dialogue, and respect for diversity. Through campaigns, pedagogy, workshops (both in-person and virtual), and partnerships with community and university media, greater citizen awareness will be fostered regarding the impact of their participation in political processes. These actions are essential to counter misinformation, strengthen social cohesion, and promote a participatory democracy, beyond the rules of representative democracy.

### **Line of Action 2.3 Strengthening institutions and good governance**

In addition to working with civil society organizations and citizens, MOE has focused its efforts on providing technical assistance and training to government institutions with electoral competence, aiming to improve their capacity to respond to citizens' demands. An example of this is the training planned for more than 200 prosecutors assigned to investigate electoral crimes, which will take place in preparation for the 2026 national elections.

In addition to workshops and seminars, MOE will be involved in making recommendations on regulations and public policies related to political-electoral processes and the fight against corruption. For instance, MOE will influence and make recommendations in the formulation of the National Electoral Guarantees Plans, the Electoral Criminal Policy, the development of good practice manuals for the use of social media in electoral contexts by various actors, and the promotion of the law against violence against women in politics with state actors, particularly with public corporations.

MOE will also continue monitoring the legislative agenda of the Congress of the Republic through the Lupa Legislativa<sup>43</sup> tool, as well as its interventions before Congress and the High Courts on political and electoral issues, transparency, and the inclusion of groups historically excluded from the political arena. Finally, MOE will remain engaged in various networks and platforms that influence and make recommendations to decision-makers on electoral and transparency issues, such as the Political Reform Interest Group (GIREPO) and the Anti-Corruption Observatories Network (RENOBA).



<sup>43</sup> Lupa Legislativa is a web platform of the MOE where the legislative agenda of the Congress of Colombia is monitored on political-electoral issues. <https://lupalegislativa.notion.site/Lupa-Legislativa-0219d76376ec4906a4446f45ed8bf6c1>



### ***Specific Objective III***

The third specific objective of the plan is to “promote the alignment of public policies on peace, security, and democracy in Colombia by formulating recommendations aimed at improving inter institutional coordination to address dynamics of violence and illegality and their impacts on social, political, economic, and environmental spheres.” This objective is linked to the following strategic line:

#### ***Strategic Line 3. Violence and its Impact on democratic processes***

Through this strategic line and considering the previously outlined context, MOE will generate information on dynamics of violence against social, political, and community leadership, as well as on territorial and socio-environmental power struggles and conflicts. The aim is to provide specific recommendations for the protection of leadership with differentiated approaches. Additionally, this effort seeks to promote the alignment of peace, security, and electoral strategies to ensure free and transparent elections in different contexts of violence.

This strategic line is supported by a technical platform composed of prominent regional analysts and academics who design and apply methodologies for producing and analyzing georeferenced information. This allows for continuous monitoring of public order situations across different regions of the country, resulting in the development of electoral risk and political power maps.

It is important to highlight that this strategic line introduces a new area of work to deepen the understanding of how electoral processes are affected by the interaction between socio-environmental conflicts, illegal economies, territorial political power, and illegal armed groups.

This strategic line consists of four (4) action lines, as follows:

#### **Line of Action 3.1 Identification and impact of violence against leadership**

MOE will continue monitoring violence against political, social, and community leadership, as well as the actions of illegal armed groups in Colombia. This phenomenon undermines organizational and democratic processes and restricts free political participation in the country. The information produced is publicly available on the Datos Electorales website.

This data is shared with government entities and decision-makers, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Attorney General's Office, the Ombudsman, the National Police, among others, as well as with sub-national authorities responsible for these matters. The objective is to issue alerts and public policy recommendations for the protection of leadership, providing essential inputs for defining prevention and mitigation actions at the territorial level.

### **Line of Action 3.2 Conflict and local powers**

MOE will continue monitoring territorial violence dynamics by tracking the presence and actions of illegal armed groups (GAI) and other armed actors in various regions of the country, making this information publicly available on the Datos Electorales website.

Additionally, MOE will maintain its monitoring of the various peace negotiations currently being conducted by the government, which, to date, include eleven dialogue round tables. The goal is to assess their impact on different stages of the electoral process.

Violence dynamics will also affect municipalities prioritized as PDET zones and those designated for CITREP seats, which will play a key role in the 2026 national elections. Therefore, MOE will analyze these territories and implement a special monitoring and deployment exercise, considering the specific risks and challenges these areas face in the electoral process.

Finally, over the next four years, this line of action will focus on strengthening research efforts related to the development of political power maps and structures. These reports provide valuable insights into the political clans that hold regional control and identify potential links between these clans and illegal campaign financing, clientelism, and illegal armed groups.

### **Line of Action 3.3 Violence against historically excluded groups**

Violence also affects leadership exercised by historically excluded groups, such as women, LGBTIQ+ individuals, and people of ethnic and racial backgrounds. In this regard, MOE incorporates variables related to violence against these groups within its methodology for monitoring violence against leadership figures.

Notably, violence against women in politics (VCMP) poses a serious threat to gender equality and the development of inclusive democracies. In addition to monitoring, MOE will engage in collaborative efforts with other civil society organizations and actively participate in the Observatory on Violence Against Women in Politics. Similarly, MOE will carry out advocacy initiatives aimed at encouraging institutions such as the National Electoral Council, public corporations, and political organizations to adopt protocols and mechanisms to prevent, address, and eliminate these forms of violence.

Finally, this line of action includes the implementation of awareness strategies to foster a political environment free of violence and discrimination. Through campaigns and leadership training, MOE seeks to challenge biases, promote respect for diversity, and strengthen a culture of dialogue and democratic coexistence.

### **Line of Action 3.4 Territory and socio-environmental conflicts**

One of the key innovations in the violence monitoring methodology for this four-year period will be tracking illegal economies with environmental impacts and their influence on democratic and electoral processes. This analysis will consider factors such as local governan-

ce, the presence of illegal armed groups, violence against leadership figures—especially environmental and land rights advocates—and broader impacts on democratic participation.

Additionally, this monitoring aims to identify and analyze the effects on citizen participation, political representation, and illicit campaign financing, taking into account the influence of illegal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and deforestation. These activities are particularly prevalent in regions rich in natural resources and subject to socio-environmental conflicts.

To achieve this, MOE will conduct a political-electoral characterization of priority territories, linking this information with findings from its political power maps and structures. These analyses identify political and economic clans in these areas and their potential connections to illegal armed groups or illicit economies. MOE will also establish new partnerships with organizations specializing in socio-environmental issues to coordinate efforts, leveraging its technical expertise and advocacy capabilities to address these challenges.

### ***Specific Objective IV***

The final specific objective of the plan is to “promote citizens’ digital rights and the responsible use of technology in political and electoral contexts through education and the analysis of its impact on political communication, citizen participation, and electoral integrity.” This fourth objective will be implemented through the following strategic line:

#### ***Strategic Line 4: Democracy in the Digital Era***

This strategic line is a new topic for the organization, considering the rapid advancement of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and their implications for democracy, participatory processes, and political representation. For this reason, MOE will establish the **Specialized Unit on Information and Communication Technologies**, a thematic area linked to MOE's National Directorate, to address the challenges that social media, artificial intelligence, and other technological advancements pose to democracy.

This strategic line will be implemented through two (2) lines of action:

#### **Line of Action 4.1 Technologies applied to the electoral cycle**

In the context of the new 2026-2027 electoral cycle, MOE will continue monitoring procurement processes and the implementation of technological solutions across the different stages of the electoral process, including the vote-counting software acquired by the electoral authority in 2022. In this regard, MOE is the only civil society organization in Colombia that oversees the procurement of goods and services by the electoral authority for the organization of elections in the country.

Additionally, through monitoring and advocacy efforts with the electoral authority, MOE will promote the adoption of safeguards to ensure public access to timely, comprehensive, and reliable information at every stage of the electoral process.



## Line of Action 4.2 Digital rights in political and electoral contexts

The creation of spaces for democratic dialogue now extends beyond traditional, formal, and informal channels of citizen and political participation. These spaces have evolved to include the civic-digital realm, serving as platforms to amplify agendas, coordinate collective actions via social media, and shape public opinion. Therefore, the strategic plan also focuses on understanding and addressing the challenges posed by democracy in the digital age, including the new forms of violence and exclusion that emerge in the environment mediated by ICTs.

The Specialized Unit on Information and Communication Technologies will focus on developing strategies to mitigate the risks of using technological tools for political communication, while respecting freedom of expression and ensuring an informed citizenry. This line will promote spaces for education on the responsible use of digital tools in the civic-democratic space, targeting opinion leaders, influencers, media, political actors, and the general public.

Through MOE, in collaboration with various organizations, efforts will be made to identify and promote mechanisms for digital dissemination of electoral information that meet the needs of populations and territories, especially in areas with greater challenges accessing this information. Additionally, MOE will work on defining national standards for the proper use of ICTs in political and electoral contexts, maintaining ongoing dialogue with electoral authorities, judicial bodies, media outlets, and social and political organizations.

Finally, this line also includes monitoring and analyzing discourse in both digital and traditional media within the framework of electoral processes. MOE runs the Media and Democracy Observatory, a platform that includes at least 15 faculties of social communication and journalism from universities across the country, who collaborate to monitor national and regional media coverage of electoral processes. MOE will also continue establishing partnerships to monitor stigmatizing discourse or malicious content on social media in political-electoral contexts.



# 6.

## Summary of the 2025-2028 Strategic Plan


<b>Title</b>	Democratic, Tolerant, and Diverse Dialogues
<b>General Objective</b>	Promote a democratic, inclusive political culture based on dialogue, through actions such as fostering social control over the integrity of electoral processes; strengthening citizen participation and democratic institutions; influencing public policies related to peace, security, and democracy; and promoting the responsible use of digital technologies and communication in political-electoral contexts.
<b>Specific Objectives</b>	<p>I. Influence democratic participation mechanisms through citizen oversight, the promotion of access to justice, and the fight against electoral corruption, as well as the generation and analysis of political-electoral</p> <p>II. Strengthen dialogue spaces between citizens, civil society organizations, and authorities, promoting an inclusive and tolerant democracy through monitoring, training, technical assistance, intervention, and dialogue with decision-makers.</p> <p>III. Promote the alignment of public policies on peace, security, and democracy by making recommendations to improve institutional coordination to address the dynamics of violence and illegality and their impacts on the social, political, economic, and environmental spheres.</p> <p>IV. Foster the digital rights of citizens and the responsible use of technologies in political and electoral contexts, through education and analysis of their impact on political communication, citizen participation, and electoral integrity.</p>
<b>Strategic Lines</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Citizen oversight of electoral integrity</li> <li>2. Civic participation and democratic institutions</li> <li>3. Violence and impacts on democratic processes</li> <li>4. Democracy in the digital era</li> </ol>
<b>Cross-cutting pillars</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Territorial approach</li> <li>» Differential approach</li> <li>» Communication for advocacy</li> <li>» Agenda internacional</li> </ul>
<b>Target Groups</b>	<p>At least 14,800 people who hold leadership roles or are linked to at least 500 social organizations, including women's, youth, community-based, religious, academic, environmental, ethnic group organizations, among others, distributed across the 32 departments of the country where the MOE has a presence through its 35 regional coordinations.</p> <p>National entities such as the National Registry Office (RNEC), National Electoral Council (CNE), Ministry of the Interior, Attorney General's Office (FGN), Public Prosecutor's Office, Ombudsman's Office, National Protection Unit (UNP), Armed Forces, and the Congress of the Republic.</p>

<b>Final Beneficiaries</b>	The general public, national and subnational authorities, national and international civil society organizations, social and community-based organizations, political organizations, and media outlets.
<b>Coverage</b>	At least 900 municipalities across the 32 departments of the country, with outreach to other countries in Latin America and the world through strategic alliances within the international networks to which the MOE belongs.
<b>Duration</b>	4 years (2025-2028)
<b>Budget</b>	\$6.000.000 USD As of October 2024, the plan has co-financing of \$964,000 USD (16%)




# STRATEGIC PLAN 2025-2028

## Democratic, Tolerant And diverse dialogues




## Cross-Cutting Pillars



# 1. Citizen oversight of electoral integrity

## Lines of Action



1.1 Apropiación de los espacios democráticos	1.2 Promoción y acceso a la Justicia Electoral	1.3 Lucha anticorrupción y transparencia electoral	1.4 Análítica de Datos Político Electorales
<p><b>1. Electoral observation</b> of national elections in 2026, including CITREP, local elections in 2027, and atypical elections.</p> <p><b>2. Electoral observation with differential</b> approaches (women, LGTBIQ+, people with disabilities, and individuals with ethnic-racial identity and belonging).</p> <p><b>3. International electoral observation.</b></p> <p><b>4. Electoral observation of citizen participation mechanisms</b> (recalls, popular consultations, plebiscites, etc.).</p> <p><b>5.</b> Monitoring and tracking of <b>the party system</b> (e.g., internal democracy).</p> <p><b>6.</b> Participation in international networks for <b>electoral integrity observation.</b></p>	<p><b>1.</b> Monitoring and legal analysis of <b>electoral regulations.</b></p> <p><b>2. Assistance with requests</b> from citizens and public institutions.</p> <p><b>3. Education</b> on the political and electoral regulatory framework.</p> <p><b>4.</b> Reception, analysis, and referral of <b>electoral crimes and irregularities</b> to authorities ("Pilas con el Voto").</p> <p><b>5.</b> Monitoring <b>barriers to electoral participation</b> (migrants, internally displaced persons, and individuals deprived of liberty).</p> <p><b>6. Promotion of democracy in the region</b> (technical assistance and international exchange of experiences).</p> <p><b>7. Communication strategy</b> for advocacy</p>	<p><b>1.</b> Monitoring the use of <b>public assets and resources for electoral purposes.</b></p> <p><b>2. Promotion of transparent and responsible private funding</b> for political organizations and electoral campaigns.</p> <p><b>3.</b> Continuous monitoring of investigations into <b>elected officials.</b></p> <p><b>4.</b> Monitoring <b>campaign financing</b> (political groups and parties).</p> <p><b>5.</b> Oversight of electoral advertising on <b>social media.</b></p> <p><b>6.</b> Monitoring the <b>contracting of electoral processes.</b></p> <p><b>7. Tracking access to public information</b> in electoral processes</p>	<p><b>1. Monitoring and processing data</b> from different stages of the electoral process (Voters registration, candidate and political group registration and access to polling stations).</p> <p><b>2. Systematization and processing of results</b> from electoral processes and citizen participation mechanisms.</p> <p><b>3. Identification and analysis of variables</b> affecting electoral processes and citizen participation mechanisms (electoral risk maps).</p> <p><b>4. Analysis of democratic behaviors and trends.</b></p>



## Strategic Line

## 2. Civic participation and democratic institutions

### Lines of Action



2.1. Strengthening participation spaces	2.2. Strengthening civil society organizations	2.3. Strengthening institutions and good governance
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Participation processes in various instances and spaces</b> (Community Action Boards, School Governments, Victims' Committees, Youth Councils).</li> <li><b>2. Monitoring and advocacy for the fulfillment of participation guarantees established in the Final Peace Agreement</b> (CITREP, Opposition Statute, and Political Reintegration).</li> <li><b>3. National and international advocacy strategy</b> on the political rights of underrepresented groups (LGTBIQ+, women and people with disabilities).</li> <li><b>4. Monitoring the political participation of underrepresented groups</b> (women; LGTBIQ+ individuals, people with disabilities, and those with ethnic-racial identity and belonging).</li> <li><b>5. Identification and analysis of regulatory gaps</b> and development of roadmaps to improve the effectiveness of democratic participation.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Implementation of capacity-building and strengthening plans</b> for regional civil society organizations in preparation for the 2026-2027 electoral cycle.</li> <li><b>2. Strengthening territorial networks</b> of social organizations.</li> <li><b>3. Promoting regional training spaces</b> for democracy and citizenship.</li> <li><b>4. Education and communication campaigns on democratic political culture.</b></li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Strengthening the capacities of authorities</b> with political-electoral functions.</li> <li><b>2. Formulating recommendations</b> for the expansion and deepening of democracy.</li> <li><b>3. Advocacy and monitoring of political reform proposals to strengthen democracy and implement Point 2 of the Peace Agreement.</b></li> <li><b>4. Monitoring and advocacy in the formulation and implementation of public policies</b> on political-electoral matters and anti-corruption.</li> <li><b>5. Tracking access to information and transparency in public management.</b></li> <li><b>6. Legislative monitoring, advocacy, and interventions before the Congress of the Republic</b> on issues related to the deepening and expansion of democracy.</li> <li><b>7. Interventions before the High Courts</b> for the protection of political-electoral rights.</li> <li><b>8. Participation in national and international anti-corruption networks.</b></li> </ol>

## 3. Territory and socio - environmental conflicts

### Líneas de acción



3.1. Identification and impacts of violence against leaderships	3.2 Conflict and local powers	3.3 Violence against historically excluded groups	3.4 Territory and socio - environmental conflicts
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Monitoring violence</b> against political, social, and community leaderships.</li> <li><b>2. Research and recommendations</b> to strengthen <b>protection and prevention policies against violence targeting leaderships.</b></li> <li><b>3. Inter-institutional coordination and advocacy actions</b> to address <b>violence against leaderships.</b></li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Analysis of territorial violence dynamics and monitoring of peace negotiations.</b></li> <li><b>2. Monitoring the presence and violent actions of illegal armed groups (GAI).</b></li> <li><b>3. Political-electoral characterization of CITREP and PDET municipalities.</b></li> <li><b>4. Research on political power structures</b> at the territorial level</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Promotion of measures to prevent, address, and eliminate violence against women in politics (VAWP).</b></li> <li><b>2. Coordination and advocacy actions to address violence against leaderships of underrepresented groups (LGTBIQ+ population, individuals with ethnic-racial identity and belonging).</b></li> <li><b>3. Awareness strategies</b> to promote a political practice free from violence and discrimination.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Monitoring illegal economies with environmental impact</b> and their influence on electoral processes.</li> <li><b>2. Environmental governance and political power structures</b> at the territorial level.</li> <li><b>3. Political-electoral characterization of territories with significant environmental wealth or socio - environmental conflict.</b></li> </ol>



## 4. Democracy in the digital era

### Lines of Action



#### 4.1 Tecnologías aplicadas al ciclo electoral

1. Identification and monitoring of the implementation of **technological solutions** applied to different stages of the electoral process.
2. Oversight and **recommendation reports on the procurement processes of technological solutions** during the electoral process.
3. **Promoting the adoption of actions that ensure timely, complete, and reliable access to information** at every stage of the electoral process.

#### 4.2 Derechos digitales en los contextos políticos y electorales

1. Identifying and promoting **digital dissemination mechanisms for electoral information** based on territorial access conditions.
2. Education on **freedom of expression and responsible use of digital tools** in the civic-democratic space (opinion leaders, influencers, media, political actors, etc.).
3. Monitoring and analyzing **discourse in digital and traditional media** during electoral processes (coverage and malicious content).
4. **Identifying and promoting standards and best practices** to strengthen democratic dialogues in the civic-digital space.


### Specialized Unit for New Technologies and Political Communication

## *Throughout 18 years, MOE has received support from the following partners:*


- » British Embassy in Colombia
- » CORDAID
- » European Union
- » Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen – IFA
- » International Republican Institute – IRI
- » Konrad Adenauer Stiftung – KAS
- » National Democratic Institute -NDI
- » National Endowment for Democracy – NED
- » Open Society Foundations
- » OXFAM
- » Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation – AECID
- » Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA
- » The United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Sustaining Peace in Colombia
- » United Nations Democracy Fund – UNDEF
- » United States Agency for International Development – USAID
- » Westminster Foundation for Democracy




## A red heart icon is centered on a pink background. The heart is a simple, stylized shape with a slight shadow, giving it a three-dimensional appearance. The pink background is a solid, light shade of pink.



## Note

A faint, stylized illustration of a jack-o'-lantern with a cross-shaped face, located in the bottom right corner of the page. The illustration is light gray and appears to be a watermark or a decorative element. It features a pumpkin-like shape with a cross-shaped face and a small stem at the top.



# SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS





## Misión de Observación Electoral - MOE

-  [www.facebook.com/moecolombia](https://www.facebook.com/moecolombia)
-  [www.instagram.com/moecolombia](https://www.instagram.com/moecolombia)
-  [www.twitter.com/moecolombia](https://www.twitter.com/moecolombia)
-  Observación al día- MOE Colombia

-  [www.youtube.com/@comunicacionmoe](https://www.youtube.com/@comunicacionmoe)
-  [www.tiktok.com/@moecolombia](https://www.tiktok.com/@moecolombia)
-  WhatsApp Pilas con el Voto
- 315 266 19 69



Plan Estratégico  
Versión Español



Strategic Plan  
English Version